Automatism

The Law

Automatism is a common law defence, where the person’s mind or body was so impaired that their actions were involuntary.

Sane automatism results from external factors or reflexes, not from a disease of the mind, and it is a complete defence that amounts to an acquittal. If accepted by the judge, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt it was a voluntary act.

Insane automatism results from an internal cause. If accepted by the judge, it is for the defence to prove on the balance of probabilities. The result is a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. This requires evidence from two recognised medical practitioners, one of whom must be duly approved.

The CPS guides prosecutors to scrutinise factors including the following:

Was there a total loss of control or was control merely impaired?
Could the suspect have reasonably foreseen the condition?
Were there any sign of its onset?
What could have been done to avoid it?
Was it self-induced?

Case Law and Key Judgements

The loss of control must be total: Broome v Perkins [1987] Crim LR 271; A-G Ref (No 2 of 1992) [1993] 3 WLR 982

These are two cases involving road traffic accidents. The former was a case of hypoglycaemia and the latter of “driving without awareness” induced by “repetitive visual stimulus experienced on long journeys on straight flat roads“. Actions such as steering away from other vehicles and braking were thought to show some residual conscious control.

The acceptability of a state for this defence may be medically nonsensical:

Hypoglycaemia secondary to insulin is sane (R v Quick [1973] 3 WLR 26), but hyperglycaemia secondary to diabetes mellitus is insane (R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287).

Sane

Reflex actions may be valid: R v Whoolley

A sneezing fit resulting in a road traffic accident has formed the basis of sane automatism.

Extraordinary trauma may be considered a valid external cause: R v Tate [1990] Crim LR 256

R v Rabey [1980] 2 SCR 513 held that:

“The ordinary stresses and disappointments of life which are the common lot of mankind do not constitute an external cause constituting an explanation for a malfunctioning of the mind which takes it out of the category of a ‘disease of the mind’”

However, whether extraordinary circumstances could be held to be a valid external factor was tested in Tate. Tate was charged with robbery and assault. Whilst on remand, she reported she had been raped three days prior to the offence. There was medical evidence to support this claim. A psychiatrist opined she was suffering from PTSD and was in a dissociative state at the time of the offence. The judge ruled that if this was automatism, it was sane rather than insane, and allowed the defence to be put to the jury. Though she was found guilty, this case established that malfunctioning of the mind due to an external factor of such extremity may be relevant to a sane, rather than insane, automatism.

Self-induced intoxication (other than alcohol or drugs) may be valid if it is not deemed to be reckless: R v Bailey [1983] Crim LR 353

“In our judgment, self-induced automatism, other than that due to intoxication from alcohol or drugs, may provide a defence to crimes of basic intent. The question in each case will be whether the prosecution have proved the necessary element of recklessness. In cases of assault, if the accused knows that his actions or inaction are likely to make him aggressive, unpredictable or uncontrolled with the result that he may cause some injury to others and he persists in the action or takes no remedial action when he knows it is required, it will be open to the jury to find that he was reckless….”

“Disinhibition is exactly not automatism”: It is not available for involuntary behaviour resulting from voluntary consumption of intoxicants R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223

There have been a number of cases where the defence has failed due to prescribed medication being taken incorrectly, for example with alcohol, and the loss of control not being total.

Insane

A physical cause is as good as a psychiatric one (arteriosclerosis): R v Kemp (1957) 1 QB 399

“It does not matter for the purposes of law, whether the defect of reason is due to a degeneration of the brain or to some other form of mental derangement. That may be a matter of importance medically, but it is of no importance to the law, which merely has to consider the state of mind in which the accused is, not how he got there.”

It can be short-lived (epilepsy): Bratty v A-G for NI [1963] AC 386; R v Sullivan [1984] AC 156

“The purpose of the legislation relating to the defence of insanity, ever since its origin in 1800, has been to protect society against the recurrence of the dangerous conduct. The duration of a temporary suspension of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding, particularly if, as in the appellant’s case, it is recurrent, cannot on any rational ground be relevant to the application by the Courts of the McNaghten Rules, though it may be relevant to the course adopted by the Secretary of State, to whom the responsibility for how the defendant is to be dealt with passes after the return of the special verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity“

May include states we do not classically consider to be diseases (sleepwalking): R v Burgess [1991] 2 WLR 1206

“We accept that sleep is a normal condition, but the evidence in the instant case indicates that sleepwalking, and particularly violence in sleep, is not normal.”

May include consequences of a lack of medication: hyperglycaemia due to diabetes mellitus: R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287